Martin Schwarzl
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Remote-Timer-as-a-Service: Efficient Microarchitectural Leakage in the Cloud with Remote Timers

Aug 17, 2026·
Martin Schwarzl
,
Haocheng Xiao
,
Albert Pedersen
,
Sam Ainsworth
,
Nigel Topham
· 0 min read
PDF arXiv
Type
Preprint
Publication
arXiv preprint arXiv:2608.17043
Last updated on Aug 17, 2026
TME-Box: Scalable In-Process Isolation through Intel TME-MK Memory Encryption Jan 1, 2025 →

© 2026 Martin Schwarzl. This work is licensed under CC BY NC ND 4.0

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