Martin Schwarzl
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    • TME-Box: Scalable In-Process Isolation through Intel TME-MK Memory Encryption
    • Collide+Power: Leaking Inaccessible Data with Software-based Power Side Channels
    • CustomProcessingUnit: Reverse Engineering and Customization of Intel Microcode
    • DOPE: DOmain Protection Enforcement with PKS
    • Layered Binary Templating
    • Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks on Memory Compression
    • Side-Channel Attacks on Optane Persistent Memory
    • SQUIP: Exploiting the Scheduler Queue Contention Side Channel
    • ÆPIC Leak: Architecturally Leaking Uninitialized Data from the Microarchitecture
    • Rapid Prototyping for Microarchitectural Attacks
    • Remote Memory-Deduplication Attacks
    • Robust and Scalable Process Isolation Against Spectre in the Cloud
    • Systematic Analysis of Programming Languages and Their Execution Environments for Spectre Attacks
    • Specfuscator: Evaluating Branch Removal as a Spectre Mitigation
    • Speculative Dereferencing of Registers: Reviving Foreshadow
    • Donky: Domain Keys--Efficient In-Process Isolation for RISC-V and x86
    • KASLR: Break It, Fix It, Repeat
    • NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network
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TME-Box: Scalable In-Process Isolation through Intel TME-MK Memory Encryption

Jan 1, 2025·
Martin Unterguggenberger
,
Lukas Lamster
,
David Schrammel
,
Martin Schwarzl
,
Stefan Mangard
· 0 min read
PDF
Type
Conference paper
Publication
NDSS 2025
Last updated on Jan 1, 2025
Collide+Power: Leaking Inaccessible Data with Software-based Power Side Channels Jan 1, 2023 →

© 2025 Martin Schwarzl. This work is licensed under CC BY NC ND 4.0

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