Paper-Conference

TME-Box: Scalable In-Process Isolation through Intel TME-MK Memory Encryption

Martin Unterguggenberger
•
Read more

SQUIP: Exploiting the Scheduler Queue Contention Side Channel

Stefan Gast
•
Read more

Side-Channel Attacks on Optane Persistent Memory

Sihang Liu
•
Read more

Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks on Memory Compression

Martin Schwarzl
•
Read more

Layered Binary Templating

Martin Schwarzl
•
Read more

DOPE: DOmain Protection Enforcement with PKS

Lukas Maar
•
Read more

Collide+Power: Leaking Inaccessible Data with Software-based Power Side Channels

Andreas Kogler
•
Read more

Systematic Analysis of Programming Languages and Their Execution Environments for Spectre Attacks

Amir Naseredini
•
Read more

Robust and Scalable Process Isolation Against Spectre in the Cloud

Martin Schwarzl
•
Read more

Remote Memory-Deduplication Attacks

Martin Schwarzl
•
Read more